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Jurisdictional Conflict in Global Antitrust
Enforcement
By Hannah L. Buxbaum*
I. Introduction
The cases that have presented the particular issue this panel
addresses-whether a foreign plaintiff can bring a private antitrust
action in U.S. court when its injury arose from a transaction
occurring on a foreign market-suggest significant challenges to
traditional methods of antitrust regulation. They include litigation
arising out of price-fixing conspiracies among vitamins
manufacturers,' providers of heavy-lift barge services, 2 and art
auction houses.3 Each of these cases has involved a conspiracy that
can be characterized as global, and not merely because of the
different actors and markets involved. First, the effectiveness of the
respective cartels depended on the linking of pricing behavior across
countries. In Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., for
instance, the plaintiffs alleged a worldwide pricing scheme that used
the prices set in the U.S. market as a benchmark for the prices set in
other countries.4 Second, the national enforcement strategies used to
counter global cartels are linked, as insufficient regulation in some
countries might create an incentive for continued anti-competitive
behavior even in the countries that do regulate sufficiently. These
cases therefore present the kind of global behavior that generates
* Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana University
School of Law-Bloomington.
1 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
2 Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap A.S. v. Heeremac V.O.F., 241 F.3d 420 (5th
Cir. 2001) [hereinafter "Statoir].
3 Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).
4 Empagran, 315 F.3d at 340-41.
5 See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
Loyola Consumer Law Review
calls for global enforcement-as Michael Hausfeld puts it, "one set
of rules, one forum."
6
At the same time, these cases also present some old questions
relating to conflicts of national economic laws, including the
limitation of a domestic regulatory law's extraterritorial reach and the
reconciliation of inconsistent procedural laws. This comment
examines some of those questions, attempting to situate the debate
about enforcement against global price-fixing cartels within the
framework of international jurisdictional law.
II. The Need to Consider Jurisdictional Restraint in
the Application of U.S. Law
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act ("FTAIA")
limits the application of U.S. antitrust law to export commerce,
stating in part that the Sherman Act does not apply to such conduct
unless:
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect-
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or
commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or
import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign
nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce
in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under [the Sherman
Act]...'
The narrow interpretation of this provision endorsed in Den
Norske Stats Qijeselskap A.S. v. Heeremac V.O.F., and forwarded by
the defendants in Kruman v. Christie's International PLC and
Empagran, would limit the availability of private actions in U.S.
courts to plaintiffs whose injuries were suffered in a transaction on
6 Michael D. Hausfeld, Five Principles of Common Sense Why Foreign
Plaintiffs Should be Allowed to Sue Under U.S. Antitrust Laws, 16 LoY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 361 (2004).
' 15 U.S.C. § 6A (2001).
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U.S. markets.8 In jurisdictional terms, this view appears to allocate
regulatory authority over global cartel behavior on the basis of
individual market transactions. Thus, a plaintiff who suffered
overcharges in a transaction taking place in the U.S. market could sue
in the United States, and one who suffered overcharges in a
transaction in Ecuador could sue in Ecuador.9
However, as the foreign plaintiffs in Empagran and the other
cases have argued, and as all the courts have agreed, this is not a
satisfactory way to view the wrong that occurred. It is the price-fixing
behavior, not the subsequent market transactions resulting in
overcharges, that is the real target of regulation.' 0 The situs of the
plaintiffs injury should therefore not alone determine the regulatory
authority of various countries affected by the cartel.1' In addition, the
narrow approach advocated in these decisions fails to recognize the
potential regulatory interest, created by the global nature of the
cartels, of countries other than the one in which a particular
transaction occurred. This interest would arise if under-enforcement
in the country on whose market the particular transaction occurred
led to under-deterrence of cartel behavior overall, leaving a
regulatory gap. 12 The potential for such gaps is most pronounced in
8 The narrow interpretation of Section (2) interprets "a claim" to mean the
particular claim of the plaintiff. It would therefore bar claims of foreign plaintiffs
arising out of foreign market transactions, as such claims would not arise from the
effect within the United States under Section (1). See Statoil, 241 F.3d at 427 ("the
FTAIA.. .demands that the domestic effect 'gives rise' to the [plaintiff's] claim").
9 Assuming, of course, that a private cause of action is available in Ecuador, a
question to which I return below.
10 See Empagran, 315 F.3d at 344-45 (identifying the price-fixing conspiracy
rather than the individual market transactions as the relevant conduct); Statoil, 241
F.3d at 426 (defining the actionable conduct as "the agreement among heavy-lift
service providers to divide territory, rig bids, and fix prices"); Kruman, 284 F.3d at
398 ("The illegal act in this case was not the imposition of high prices but the
formation of the agreement to fix prices.").
" The situs of the injury is, however, relevant to the subsequent jurisdictional
restraint analysis. See infra.
12 The Court in Empagran noted:
We are persuaded that, if foreign plaintiffs could not enforce the
antitrust laws with respect to the foreign effects of anticompetitive
behavior, global conspiracy would be under-deterred, since the
perpetrator might well retain the benefits that the conspiracy accrued
abroad. There would be an incentive to engage in global conspiracies,
because, even if the conspirator has to disgorge his U.S. profits in suits
by domestic plaintiffs, he would very possibly retain his foreign profits,
2004] 367
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the case of developing countries, where the lack of antitrust laws may
leave anti-competitive conduct entirely unregulated. 13 Even countries
that do regulate, however, might impose fines or penalties at a level
too low to cause full disgorgement of the benefits received by cartel
participants. In such situations, other countries, including the United
States, might indeed have a valid interest in regulating the cartel.
But recognizing that the United States may have a valid
interest in regulating certain conduct is not the same thing as
concluding that its laws in fact reach all such conduct. The question
raised in these global cartel cases remains, fundamentally, a question
about the prescriptive jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust law. When we say
that a foreign plaintiff can sue in a U.S. court, in other words, we are
not merely providing a forum: we are saying that U.S. antitrust law
reaches the conduct in question. The debate over whether the FTAIA
permits such actions therefore needs to be more firmly situated within
the framework of international jurisdictional law. In particular, it
needs to address possible limits on the extraterritorial application of
U.S. law when that application would cause regulatory conflict with
other countries. The failure of the broad interpretation of the FTAIA
is its complete disregard of such limits.
The broad view of the FTAIA endorsed by Kruman and
Empagran permits litigation in U.S. courts by foreign plaintiffs
whose own injuries were suffered in a foreign-market transaction. In
both cases, plaintiffs established the existence of direct and
substantial effects within the United States; the decisions therefore
turned on the interpretation of Section 6(a)(2) of the FTAIA. In
Kruman, the court held that "the 'effect' on domestic commerce need
not be the basis for a plaintiff's injury, it only must violate the
substantive provisions of the Sherman Act."' 14 The Empagran court
applied a slightly different version of this broad test, holding that the
effects of the conduct "must give rise to 'a claim' by someone, even
which may make up for his U.S. liability.
See Empagran, 315 F.3d at 356. This deterrence analysis draws on an earlier case
in which the Supreme Court considered whether foreign governments are entitled
to assert private antitrust claims in U.S. courts. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India,
434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978) (suggesting that if "potential antitrust violators must take
into account the full costs of their conduct, American consumers are benefited by
the maximum deterrent effect of treble damages upon all potential violators").
13 See Eleanor Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J.
INT'L L. 911, 923 (2003) (noting that many developing countries lack either
antitrust laws or the resources to enforce existing laws).
14 Kruman, 284 F.3d at 400.
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if not the foreign plaintiff who is before the court.' 5 While this
approach solves the regulatory gap problem noted above, it will in
many situations create regulatory overlap. In cases in which the
country where the plaintiffs transaction occurred also regulates,
permitting a private claim in the United States, under U.S. law, may
create a regulatory conflict.
It is important to note that the conflict will not necessarily
arise from a difference in anti-cartel policy itself. In fact, most
countries with developed antitrust regimes have similar anti-cartel
policies (at least with respect to hard-core price-fixing conspiracies,
which are almost universally condemned).' Proponents of the broad
view seem to suggest, on the basis of this policy similarity, that
offering foreign plaintiffs private rights of action does not interfere
with foreign policy, in that the private actions enhance deterrence and
also provide compensation to the direct victims of the conspiracy.
Under the broad view, they argue, U.S. actions do not create conflict
at all, but rather serve the shared anti-cartel policy by making
additional enforcement resources available.17
What this view ignores, however, are the quite substantial
differences in policy regarding the implementation of antitrust laws.'
8
Many developed antitrust regimes use only administrative and
criminal proceedings to enforce against anti-competitive behavior,
and have rejected the use of private rights of action. Other regimes
may provide for private antitrust litigation, but reject the award of
treble damages, viewing the appropriate remedy in such cases as one
of compensation alone. In addition, some countries' enforcement
strategies include leniency programs, whose effectiveness might be
15 Empagran, 315 F.3d at 350. On this slightly narrower view, the court
explained, the conduct's effect within the United States "must do more than give
rise to a government action for violation of the Sherman Act"-it must give rise to
a private claim. Id.
16 For a partial survey, see Jacqueline Bos, Antitrust Treatment of Cartels: A
Comparative Survey of Competition Law Exemptions in the United States, the
European Union, Australia and Japan, 1 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 415
(2002).
17 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 48, F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v.
Empagran, S.A. (2004) (No. 03-724) (discussing this as a matter of "overlapping
jurisdictional regimes" rather than as one of conflict), available at 2004 WL
533935.
18 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS § 3.2 (1995) (noting
that different enforcement methods may create conflict even in the absence of
conflict as to underlying regulatory policy).
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undermined by the availability of private actions.19 Thus, the
application of U.S. law to claims arising out of transactions in those
countries would interfere-sometimes quite significantly-with the
regulatory choices of other sovereigns. The failure of the broad view
is in neglecting to consider the constraints that international law
imposes on the extraterritorial application of U.S. law when such
conflicts exist.
To make this point more concrete, consider a hypothetical in
which the cartel participants are European companies, and, while the
cartel's activity has created anti-competitive effects in the United
States sufficient to satisfy the first section of the FTAIA, the
overwhelming majority of the cartel's effects are felt in Europe. A
plaintiff purchases price-fixed goods in France, and subsequently
brings a treble damages action in U.S. court against a French
participant in the cartel. France has enacted a blocking statute
providing that the award of any non-compensatory amounts in such a
case will not be recognized in France. In addition, the French
government objects to the action in U.S. courts on the ground that the
availability of multiple damages in such suits undercuts the leniency
programs that are an essential component of French antitrust
20enforcement mechanisms. Such a case presents direct regulatory
conflict. The U.S. policy in favor of treble damages collides with
both the French policy of shielding its own nationals from the
imposition of excessive damages and a specific mechanism of French
antitrust enforcement policy. In such a case, given that the conduct in
question is linked less closely to the United States than it is to France,
19 The amicus briefs filed by foreign governments in the Empagran litigation
before the Supreme Court raise this issue. See, e.g., Brief of the Governments of the
Federal Republic of Germany and Belgium as Amici Curiae at *28-30, F.
Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A. (2004) (No. 03-724), available at 2004
WL 226388; Brief for the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae at *13-14, F.
Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A. (2004) (No. 03-724), available at 2004
WL 226389. In fact, a similar point is raised by the United States government's
submission arguing in favor of the narrow interpretation. See Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at *19-20, F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A.
(2004) (No. 03-724) (stating that the broad view "would undermine the
effectiveness of the [U.S.] government's amnesty program"), available at 2004 WL
234125.
20 For a similar hypothetical, see the Brief of the Government of Canada at
*14, Empagran (No. 03-724) ("The conflict with Canadian antitrust regulation and
the intrusion on Canadian sovereignty would perhaps be most direct in the case of
cartel behavior by Canadian companies that injured Canadian nationals.. .In
comparison to Canada's interest, the interests of the United States would be
meager. ..").
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jurisdictional principles would suggest that the U.S. interest was
insufficient to permit a private action in domestic courts.
21
Arguing that principles of international comity are critical to
an analysis of extraterritoriality, of course, does not necessarily mean
that all actions by foreign plaintiffs are inconsistent with private
international law. If, for instance, the defendant in the hypothetical
above were a U.S. company, the French regulatory interest would
appear weaker. The primary purpose of blocking statutes is to protect
companies in the adopting state from multiple damages awards, and a
suit against a U.S. defendant would therefore not trigger this
22interest. In such a case, particularly if the overall effects of the
cartel are felt much more strongly in the United States than in
Europe, 23 the application of U.S. law appears more reasonable. Or
consider a case stemming from a purchase transaction in a country
that has an anti-cartel policy on the books, but is unable to enforce it
due to a lack of resources. In such a situation, there is little real
sovereign conflict that would counsel the invocation of comity. But
many actions brought by private plaintiffs, including those brought
against European companies and arising out of transactions in
Europe, would present real questions of jurisdiction under
international law. To ignore the regulatory conflicts that arise in
international antitrust cases, as the broad interpretation of the FTAIA
does, is to ignore the international law framework within which
questions of extraterritoriality should be addressed.
The key question here, of course, is whether the Supreme
Court's decision in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California25 has made
the analysis of international law constraints impossible. In Hartford
Fire, the Court addressed the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust law generally, and did not speak to the role of comity in
21 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987).
22 It is true that one might make an additional argument for the foreign
regulatory interest in such a case, which is that plaintiffs should not be unjustly
enriched. On that view, the foreign interest in preventing multiple damages awards
would be implicated by any lawsuit initiated by one of its own citizens.
23 And the connections of the conduct were therefore stronger in the United
States than elsewhere.
24 It is worth noting that the amicus curiae briefs filed by foreign governments
in the Empagran litigation represent governments that do actively regulate anti-
competitive activity.
25 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
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FTAIA analysis in particular. 26 However, the Court held that only in
the event of a true conflict would considerations of comity be (even
potentially) relevant, and then proceeded to define "true conflict"
quite narrowly.27 It seems unlikely that the Court will reverse that
decision,28 and if a conflict as to the legality of particular conduct
under competing antitrust regimes is not viewed as presenting a true
conflict, it is difficult to see how a conflict of enforcement
mechanisms would be. In other contexts, though, courts have taken
competing sovereign interests into account. As I have noted
elsewhere, for instance, courts have enforced foreign governing-law
clauses in response to transnational concerns, despite the resulting
non-application of U.S. antitrust law.29 Thus, a broader view of the
need for jurisdictional restraint--one that transcends the specific
doctrine of comity as treated in Hartford Fire-might yet be
achieved.
III. Private Treble Damages Actions as the Vehicle for
Application of U.S. Law
Although the debate over the interpretation of the FTAIA is a
debate about the extraterritorial application of U.S. law, the particular
remedy at stake-treble damages-is relevant to the degree of
regulatory conflict presented. Private treble damages actions under
public regulatory law are uniquely American, and the availability of
multiple damages awards has been one of the major sources of
26 See id at 798 (noting that Congress had expressed no view on the
availability of comity when it enacted the FTAIA).
27 See id. at 799 ("No conflict exists, for these purposes, 'where a person
subject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both."') (citing the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES)).
28 Hartford Fire was a 5-4 decision and has drawn substantial criticism. See,
e.g., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of
Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 42 (1995). In addition, some lower courts have continued to apply comity
analysis in cases of antitrust conflict. See Spencer Weber Waller, The United States
as Antitrust Courtroom to the World: Jurisdiction and Standing Issues in
Transnational Litigation, 14 LoY. CONSUMER L. REv. 523, 528 (2002) (noting that
"certain lower courts often behave as if Hartford Fire does not exist").
29 And therefore non-availability of treble damages. See Hannah L. Buxbaum,
The Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public Interests in Private
International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219 (2001). See also infra
Part IV for a discussion of cases in which courts have dismissed on the basis of
forum non conveniens.
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contention between the United States and other countries regarding
international antitrust cases. 30 Although other regimes have indicated
growing acceptance of private causes of action in recent years, they
have not similarly accepted the use of multiple damages awards.
Therefore, the use of private litigation as the vehicle for application
of U.S. law, or, more particularly, the award of multiple damages in
such litigation, is likely to exacerbate the reaction of foreign
32governments to that application. In light of this background, it is
important to separate the goal of maximizing deterrence by filling
possible regulatory gaps from the choice of a particular mechanism
by which to achieve that goal.
As the cases highlighting the United States' interest in
worldwide enforcement suggest,33 the policy of deterrence would be
satisfied if the overall level of penalty imposed on a cartel is
sufficient to make price-fixing behavior affecting the U.S. market
unprofitable for cartel participants. But that policy could be satisfied
through public regulation rather than through private enforcement: if
the aggregate fines imposed by the United States and by other
countries were high enough, the conduct would be deterred. While
the United States has an additional interest in permitting plaintiffs in
the United States to sue, and receive compensation for their injuries,
it has no such interest with respect to foreign plaintiffs.34 The broad
30 Buxbaum, supra note 29, at 251.
31 See generally Clifford A. Jones, Exporting Antitrust Courtrooms to the
World: Private Enforcement in a Global Market, 16 LoY. CONSUMER L. REv. 409
(2004) (discussing the growing availability of private actions in non-U.S. systems,
as well as the limitations on such actions). Note that the English High Court has in
fact already heard a private claim arising out of the vitamins cartel itself. See
Provimi Ltd. v. Aventis Animal Nutrition S.A., [2003] E.W.H.C. 1211 (Comm.
May 6, 2003).
32 It is worth emphasizing that in other contexts foreign governments have
been quite willing to accept the concurrent application of U.S. and foreign
regulatory law. In merger regulation, for instance, the simultaneous exercise of
regulatory authority by the European Union and the United States has become
commonplace. See infra note 47. The availability of multiple damages awards
presents an independent obstacle.
33 See supra note 10.
34 The Supreme Court discussed in Pfizer the goal of compensating victims of
antitrust injuries, and noted that denying a foreign plaintiff the right to sue "would
deny compensation to certain of his victims, merely because he happens to deal
with foreign customers." Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 314-15. Providing compensation to
non-U.S. purchasers, however, does not seem to be a valid sovereign interest of the
United States.
2004]
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view therefore unnecessarily conflates the goal of compensation with
the goal of deterrence.
IV. Avoiding Unnecessary Procedural Conflict
The last point I would like to raise in this comment relates to
a different kind of conflict that is likely to result from the unrestricted
availability of private actions in the United States: conflicts of
international civil procedure. Litigating a case in U.S. court when the
plaintiff, defendant, and purchase transaction are all located in a
foreign country is likely to create substantial procedural conflict. The
mechanics of cross-border litigation involving service of process and,
especially, the discovery of evidence abroad are not only
procedurally complicated, but continue to generate real friction
between governments.35 In addition, a judgment renaered in the
United States for multiple damages may not be readily enforceable in
other countries. 36 The free availability of private actions in global
antitrust cases would therefore create an additional layer of
international procedural conflict on top of the conflict already created
by differences in antitrust enforcement policy.
37
These procedural difficulties are both recognized and
potentially solved by the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which
might be invoked to dismiss an antitrust action brought in the United
States if a U.S. court found an alternative foreign forum to be more
35 In 2003, the Hague Conference on Private International Law convened a
Special Commission to review the operation of three of its conventions, including
the Service Convention and the Evidence Convention. The submissions by various
governments in response to questions regarding these instruments reveal continued
conflict in these areas. See generally Hague Conference on Private International
Law, Work in Progress on the Practical Application of the Hague Legalisation,
Service and Evidence Conventions, at http://www.hcch.net/e/
workprog/seintro.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2004).
36 Some countries have adopted blocking statutes preventing local courts from
enforcing the multiplied portion of damages awards. Several statutes also include
"clawback" provisions, under which the multiple portion may be recovered if it was
satisfied by assets of the defendant within the United States. See generally Joseph
P. Griffin, Foreign Governmental Reactions to U.S. Assertions of Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 505 (1995).
37 In fact, the vitamins litigation has already generated two separate decisions
on the issue of which procedures to use for gathering evidence located outside the
United States. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2000)
(addressing jurisdictional discovery); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. 99-
197TFH, 2001 WL 1049433 (D.D.C. June 20, 2001) (addressing merits discovery).
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convenient. 38 In one recent case, Capital Currency Exchange, N.V. v.
National Westminster Bank PLC, the Second Circuit considered a
private antitrust claim brought by a Netherlands Antilles company
against two English banks.39 The court affirmed the trial court's
dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens, noting that the
private interest factors at stake in the case, including availability of
witnesses and documentary evidence, spoke in favor of the
alternative English forum. VIt found that an adequate alternative
remedy was available in England, as provisions of the Treaty of
Rome permitted private rights of action against anti-competitive
conduct.4' The holding was not affected by plaintiff's evidence that
no English court had ever awarded monetary damages in such an
action. 2 The court also noted that the absence of treble damages did
not render the foreign remedy inadequate.43
I do not raise forum non conveniens to suggest that the
doctrine can solve the difficulties arising from the availability of
private actions in U.S. courts in cases of regulatory conflict. Indeed,
dismissal on that basis is permissible only when there is an adequate
alternative remedy abroad. Thus, a U.S. court would have no
authority to order dismissal of a case involving a foreign transaction
38 Although dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens was historically
not available in cases involving U.S. regulatory law, recent decisions have
permitted it. See, e.g., Capital Currency Exch., N.V. v. Nat'l Westminster Bank
PLC, 155 F.3d 603 (2d Cir. 1998) (dismissing an antitrust claim); Howe v.
Goldcorp Inv., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1991) (dismissing a securities law
claim); Transunion Corp. v. Pepsico, Inc., 811 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1987) (dismissing
a RICO claim). See also CSR Ltd. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 484 (D.N.J.
2001) (denying dismissal in an antitrust case due to the balance of convenience
factors, but noting that "for the purposes of forum non conveniens analysis, U.S.
antitrust law is not categorically distinct from the antitrust laws that are enforceable
in certain other nations... [w]hile certain countries may have no parallel legislation,
others may provide a sufficiently similar cause of action through their domestic law
or through treaty obligations.").
39 Capital Currency, 155 F.3d at 603.
40 Id. at 611.
41 Id. at 610 (holding that Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty "are roughly
analogous to Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act").
42 Id. (concluding that "although English courts have not yet awarded damages
in an antitrust case, it appears that English courts have the power to do so.")
(emphasis in original).
43 Id. (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), for the
proposition that the possibility of a lower recovery does not bar forum non
conveniens dismissal).
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if the country in question did not permit private rights of action at
all. 44 Rather, I would suggest that the complexities courts recognize
and respond to in forum non conveniens motions should be
recognized earlier, at the stage of determining regulatory jurisdiction,
through consideration of restraints on the application of U.S. law. I
also note that Capital Currency, consistent with forum non
conveniens cases in other areas of regulatory law, explicitly accepts
as adequate private causes of action without multiple damages. 45 This
acceptance suggests that at least the multiple portion of damages
awards, a factor that is the source of particular contention in the
international antitrust enforcement area, need not be viewed as an
indispensable element of U.S. enforcement policy.
V. Conclusion
Interpreting the FTAIA to permit private antitrust actions by
all foreign plaintiffs, including those injured in transactions in
countries which themselves actively regulate cartels, will bring the
United States into regulatory conflict with other nations. Although
regulatory conflict in the area of antitrust law is certainly not new, it
is important to note the general trend of recent years in favor of
cooperation in global antitrust efforts. Agencies charged with the
enforcement of antitrust laws have entered into bilateral memoranda
of understanding with their counterparts in other jurisdictions,
facilitating the exchange of information and regulatory assistance in
cross-border enforcement; 46 . multijurisdictional review of proposed
mergers has become commonplace; 47 and commentators have
44 See id. (emphasizing that a foreign forum is adequate only if the plaintiff
would be able to litigate the subject matter of its claim in that forum).
45 Capital Currency, 155 F.3d at 603. The other cases ordering dismissal of
claims brought under regulatory law have similarly noted that the absence of treble
damages does not render dismissal inappropriate. See, e.g., Howe, 946 F.2d at 944;
Transunion Corp., 811 F.2d at 127.
46 The Department of Justice has entered into bilateral memoranda of
understanding with regulators in the European Union and a number of countries.
See United States Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Cooperation Agreements, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov (last visited Apr. 28, 2004).
47 Concurrent review has become perhaps most clearly institutionalized
between the United States and the European Union. In 2002, regulators adopted a
statement of Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations, establishing
an "advisory framework for interagency cooperation." See United States Dept. of
Justice, US-EU Merger Working Group, Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger
Investigations (Oct. 30, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
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48identified growing convergence in substantive antitrust regulation.
In this climate of increased cooperation, and in recognition of the
shared goal of effective international antitrust enforcement, one
might well question the expanded use of an enforcement mechanism
that creates additional conflict.
public/international/docs/200405.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2004).
48 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 13, at 913 (discussing the WTO's Doha
Declaration and its attention to "core principles" of competition law); Gary N.
Horlick & Michael A. Meyer, The International Convergence of Competition
Policy, 29 INT'L LAW. 65 (1995).
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